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Politics and Heidegger:
Aristotle, Superman, and Žižek
Babette Babich
“Philosophy is metaphysics”1—so Heidegger reminds us and goes on to
explain what metaphysics does. As we recall his 1929 inaugural lecture,
“What is Metaphysics?” the project of questioning/defining metaphysics
is one he undertakes throughout his life, so that as we read in 1964: “Metaphysics thinks beings as a whole—the world, man, God—with respect
to Being, with respect to the belonging together of beings in Being.”2 In
addition to Descartes, and hence with implicit reference to Husserl, Heidegger’s moves follow Kant on metaphysics in each of the cases noted
above. They do so, first, in negative detail, as Kant reflects in his Prolegomena, where he critically writes:
There is no single book to which you can point as you do to Euclid,
and say: “This is metaphysics; here you may find the noblest objects of
this science, the knowledge of a highest being and of a future existence,
proved from principles of pure reason.”3

Thus, Heidegger begins “What is Metaphysics?” on the basis of Kant’s initial reference here to the “other sciences,” as these are literally exemplary
just where metaphysics is not. These “other sciences” are the mathematical

1. Martin Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” in On Time
and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (San Francisco: Harper, 1972), p. 55.
2. Ibid., pp. 55–56.
3. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Lewis White
Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), p. 20.
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and natural sciences whereby, as Heidegger argues, deploying to this end a
distinction developed by Aristotle:
Mathematical knowledge is no more rigorous than philological-historical knowledge. It merely has the character of exactness which does not
coincide with rigor. To demand exactness in the area of history is to
violate the idea of the specific rigor of the humanities.4

In this project, Heidegger asks what the scientific attitude is all about and
poses the further question of nothing, famous to us, if for no other reason,
because just this emphasis sets Heidegger up for mockery by Carnap (and
others) as Heidegger ironically notices for and if nothing else “one thing is
sure: science wishes to know nothing of the nothing,” indeed, “we know
it, the nothing, in that we wish to know nothing about it.”5
Heidegger undertakes to raise a question usually neglected, and rightly
so we may suspect. Thus he says, the “nothing is conceded. With a studied
indifference, science abandons it as ‘what is not.’”6 To raise a question
about nothingness is to immediately be confronted by the one science that
seems as certainly secure as a science if anything is, even mathematics,
and that is logic.
By “asking what and how it, the nothing, is,”7 as Heidegger points out,
we have already contradicted ourselves, which catches us in a bind following the “ground rule of all thinking, the proposition that contradictions are
to be avoided.”8 And as we know from Being and Time, held out into the
nothing as we are, qua thrown finite being, also renders the human being
nothing less than “a lieutenant of the nothing.”9 And it is this, before this
our utter finitude, that brings us “face to face with metaphysics itself.”10
Thus we read, again, that what is to be named metaphysics beyond the fancied conventionality that places Aristotle’s treatises apart from his Physics
and thus and simply in its wake, is to be understood as “inquiry beyond
4. Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics,” trans. David Farrell Krell, in Basic
Writings (San Francisco, Harper, 1977), p. 96. This well-known allusion to Aristotle distinguishes between kinds of rigor and the capacity to distinguish between the same.
5. Ibid., p. 98.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 99.
9. Ibid., p. 108.
10. Ibid.
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or over beings which aims to recover them as such and as a whole for our
grasp.”11 Here “the nothing does not remain the indeterminate opposite of
beings but reveals itself as belonging to the Being of beings.”12 Whereby
and “assuming that the question of Being as such is the encompassing
question of metaphysics, then the question of the nothing proves to be
such that it embraces the whole of metaphysics.”13 Which embrace in turn
brings us up against “the decision concerning the legitimacy of the rule of
‘logic’ in metaphysics.”14
When Heidegger raises the question that is for him inseparable from
the question of Being, from the project of thinking Being, thinking the
coincidence or correspondence of Being and thinking, he notes that the
obstacle here is what we take ourselves to know about nothing. This kind
of talk remains dominant, as Heidegger says—still thinking of Carnap but
also of his followers—“Science would like to dismiss the nothing with a
lordly wave of the hand.”15
At issue is the problem of talking about nothing, of raising the question of nothing: “The question of the nothing puts us, the questioners, in
question.”16 In other words:
human existence can relate to beings only if it holds itself out into the
nothing. Going beyond beings occurs in the essence of Dasein. But
this going beyond is metaphysics itself. This implies that metaphysics
belongs to the “nature of man.”17

In this sense, we begin to understand why Heidegger takes the basic question of metaphysics to be “Why are there beings at all, and why not rather
nothing?”18
Whether we follow Heidegger or not, we see that his inquiry follows
the specific project of Kant’s critical philosophy, that which is to be set
on the “critical” high road of a “science,” as the natural sciences and as
mathematics can be said to be locatable on the road of science, is what
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Ibid., p. 109.
Ibid., p. 110.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 111.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 111–12.
Ibid., p. 112.
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Kant calls “metaphysics,” which as he says in his preface to the Critique
was once given the title of the “Queen of all the sciences.”19
The problem is in a knowledge that goes beyond the physical domain
(which is the reason that Hume’s critique of causality serves as it does as
wake-up call for Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, and not less as that
critique specifically applies to the physical domain itself, a recognition
Eugene Wigner takes even further by speaking of the wondrous nature of
mathematics, “wondering” indeed that mathematics should apply to the
world at all, just given its all-too-human origins).20 Pointing out that the
students of science itself made what progress they made by recognizing
a certain Copernican revolution of terms, that is, again, “that reason has
insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own and that it
must not allow itself to be kept, as it were, in nature’s leading strings”—
note here that this would be the conformity between the intellect and the
world to be known—“but must itself show the way with principles of
judgment based upon fixed laws, constraining nature to give answer to
questions of reason’s own determining.”21 What is wanted are necessary
laws, for only qua necessary can one speak of law in the realm of nature,
which then presupposes a certain metaphysical schema.
But where physical science, by attending to nature must take as its
guide “that which it has itself put into nature,”22 thus formalizes the teachings of experience and thereby permits their extension, metaphysics “is a
completely isolated science of reason,” soaring “far above the teachings of
experience,” resting “on concepts alone—not, like mathematics, on their
application to intuition.”23
Thus Kant reflects that following both the physical sciences and the
mathematical sciences (which is thus marvelously for Wigner intuitively
and indeed empirically applicable) suggests that we should suppose that
19. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 7.
20. Eugene Wigner, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural
Sciences,” Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics 131 (1960): 1–14. For a
brief discussion in connection with Nietzsche (and thence to Husserl and Heidegger), see
Babette Babich, “Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and
Bugbears, Whigs and Waterbears,” International Journal of the Philosophy of Science 24,
no. 4 (2010): 354ff.
21. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 20.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 21.
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and in general, “knowledge must conform to our knowledge”24 rather than
the other way around, arguing as he does that the object “must conform to
the constitution of our faculty of intuition,”25 which famously allows Kant
to express as his new methodology for thinking that “we can know a priori
of things only what we ourselves put into them.”26
The metaphysical references that Heidegger details are Kantian
(enough): the world, that would be the object of the physical sciences as
such, including cosmology, the human being (as Kant speaks of it in terms
of freedom and morality), and God. We see this in the range of his antinomies, beginning with the Platonic program for axiomatic reasoning as one
can read in the Timaeus concerning the disjunction between the world as
always having been or else as having “a beginning in time,” as of parts and
whole (and simples), causality/freedom, and God as creator.
For Heidegger, “every metaphysical question always encompasses the
whole range of metaphysical problems. Each question is itself always the
whole.”27 He continues to say that “[a]ll metaphysics, including its opponent, positivism, speaks the language of Plato”28 (and so too, as we have
noted, does Heidegger himself speak with Plato), but Heidegger moves to
Parmenides, to the one that, as we know, serves as guide to both Plato and
Socrates.29
Hence it is worth thinking that many regard a post-metaphysical age
as an age beyond the revelations of the church, as beyond the modernistic
confidence game that is the reign of humanism. But the church is still
with us—as in a fair moment of unkindness, Nietzsche rebuked those who
supposed themselves “his” free spirits, that is to say, as his converted followers, that is to say, his best readers, for “apart from the church, we too
still love its poison.”30
24. Ibid., p. 22 (my emphasis).
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics,” p. 95.
28. Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” p. 67.
29. Peter Kingsley, among others, is useful here to outline the complexities of such
guidance. See Kingsley, In the Dark Places of Wisdom (Inverness, CA: Golden Sufi Press,
1999). See also Sara Rappe, Reading Neoplatonism: Non-Discursive Thinking in the Texts
of Plotinus, Proclus, and Damascius (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000).
30. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter
Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 36, my emphasis.
Nietzsche’s Genealogy, if it is anything, is an analysis of poison and the way it works on
us, and for some reason only Derrida has managed to foreground this effectively, while
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The church, despite our lack of theism, faith, or even an historical
sense for tradition, is hardly vanished from the earth if we recognize it not
as it once functioned, i.e., as the church of Rome, of Wittenberg, Zürich,
and Geneva, but and rather in its most recondite form, as I take this form
in the sense in which has Nietzsche argued it, attending to evolution or
genealogy, and which form thus includes the church in what turns out to
be its latest, Nietzsche says its “best” form, namely, modern science. Here
Heidegger would include technology, as Nietzsche underscores the high
church character of science and its deliberate pretension to this position. In
all its sundry forms, the “church” today would thus include both modern
technology and modern science, and the “church,” as well as the academy
and above all the corporate world and political world, and especially in
the guise, if one is in want of ceremony and circumstance, of the entertainment industry, that Adorno honored by naming the “culture” industry, this
last sheerly in tribute to the technological mediations of the same.31
Similarly widespread is our humanism, as it may be seen as we collectively and very literally at the cost of all other beings (animal, plant,
mineral) continue to clear-cut a world-for-ourselves, flattened into our
own image, on every continent, in every corner of the earth, throughout
all space, real and increasingly unreal, that is virtual, that is our networked
worlds of self/actor/avatar.32 Thus to the high “church” of the digital, of
blinding us at the same time to seeing the way this operates in Nietzsche. To describe this
as I have elsewhere tried to explain the efficacy of ressentiment as and in Nietzsche’s style,
as and in the substance of the text, Deleuze is indispensable. Many authors, including
Derrida, but also Deleuze, Fink, and the present author, have foregrounded the interplay of
style (and ressentiment) in Nietzsche’s text and/as this text works upon the reader, which
can just as well mean as this text steers clear of appropriation. See my “The Genealogy
of Morals and Right Reading: On the Nietzschean Aphorism and the Art of the Polemic”
in Christa Davis Acampora, ed., Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp. 171–90.
31. I discuss this on several occasions. See most recently Babette Babich, “Adorno
on Science and Nihilism, Animals, and Jews,” Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale 14, no. 1 (2011): 110–45.
32. Beyond the still insufficiently received Baudrillard, I recommend attention to
Jacques Ellul but not less to Ivan Illich and Heidegger’s (and Adorno’s) student Günther
Anders. I discuss Illich and his critique of pedagogy as the most efficient means of political
ideology in the first half of Babette Babich, “Education and Exemplars: Learning to Doubt
the Overman,” in Paul Fairfield, ed., Education, Dialogue and Hermeneutics (London:
Continuum, 2011), pp. 125–49. I turn to Anders at the conclusion of my essay on Sloterdijk
(along with Slavoj Žižek) in Babette Babich, “Sloterdijk’s Cynicism: Diogenes in the Marketplace,” in Stuart Elden, ed., Sloterdijk Now (Oxford: Polity, 2011), pp. 17–36, 186–89.
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techno-media economic development at any price and without the slightest advantage to the common individual, we may add the ongoing cult of
ourselves as fantasy projection.
The new theorists of net culture concede and embrace all of this. This
is what it is to be cyborg, to be transhuman, that is to say to be, as some
analysts prefer here following Bruno Latour’s important work over many
years, to be part of the “network of actors.”33 Technology here is not in
question other than and to the extent that we want more details on how to
be more (never less) “integrated” in Jean Baudrillard’s telling language,
as he uses this in his Intelligence of Evil and which he extends beyond
Heidegger, beyond Simondon and de Certeau.34 In this fashion Heidegger
himself is able to add that following today’s “technological” turn, “‘philosophy’ has been in the constant predicament of having to justify its
existence before the sciences,”35 which of course and as the turn to neuroscience and evolutionary and related theory also exemplifies Heidegger’s
point in our day, as Kant’s appeal to Galileo and Newton would seem to
have demonstrated the same in his own time, philosophy tends to believe
that it can best justify its existence “by elevating itself to the rank of a
science.”36
33. See Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-NetworkTheory (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005) as well as his slightly more subversive Science in
Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society (Milton Keynes: Open
UP, 1987).
34. Jean Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact, trans. Chris Turner
(London: Berg, 2005).
35. Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” p. 194.
36. Ibid. In a recent “history of philosophy” (i.e., in what is a fairly analytically
minded) essay, Cathryn Carson, while drawing a number of useful parallels between Heidegger and Habermas vis-à-vis Heisenberg (who remains an elusive figure just because
he is also a philosophic voice in his own right), manages to both understate and affirm
Heidegger’s pre-1930s interest in science. See Cathryn Carson, “Science as Instrumental
Reason: Heidegger, Habermas, Heisenberg,” Continental Philosophical Review 42 (2010):
485. One could, with some justification, see Carson as setting Heisenberg in the place
of an earlier generation’s setting of Carnap contra Heidegger, or indeed Cassirer contra
Heidegger. But Carson uncritically, and this is worrisome, repeats a popular convention
contra Heidegger’s account of Planck in Heidegger’s “Science and Reflection,” a popular
conventionality that was instigated or claimed by Planck. Yet in his 1909 lecture series at
Columbia University, published in German in that year, Planck poses the question “What
lies at the bottom of physics?” and answers his own question: “measurements” (Max
Planck, Eight Lectures on Theoretical Physics: Delivered at Columbia University in 1909,
trans. A. P. Wills [New York: Columbia UP, 1915], p. 3). As Planck explains, “mathematics is the chief tool with which this material is worked. All physical ideas depend upon
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When Heidegger calls for us to learn thinking, he reminds us that
only those who are thinking can “come to know what it means to think.”37
And the paradox there, a paradox that belongs to the koan, that belongs to
every kind of wisdom (that too, Nietzsche says, is a kind of youth), is that
as “soon as we allow ourselves to become involved in such learning we
have admitted that we are not yet capable of thinking.”38 It is in this text
that Heidegger, who had taken over a certain critical stance toward the
sciences already from Nietzsche, utters his most unforgivable statement:
“science does not think,” qualifying that his own declarations are hollow
enough, emphasizing that “what has been presented here has nothing to
do with scientific knowledge,”39 adding that this is inevitable if that is to
say, “the discussion itself is to be a thinking.”40 But the point of this as he
emphasizes is to science’s own advantage, assuring “its proper course.”41
Nor is Heidegger unaware of the political risks involved in his claim
that “science does not think.”42 As he reflects, one does well to “let the
statement be shocking” and remarks that “science always and in its own
fashion has to do with thinking,” provided indeed that one realize that the
“fashion” in question is genuine and consequently “fruitful only after the
gulf has become visible that lies between thinking and the sciences, lies
there unbridgeably.”43 Which last only means, as he explains, that one must
“leap” into thinking and that only such a leap brings us into the “region
where thinking remains,” a leap that thereby and at once takes us to a place
where “everything is different, so different that it strikes us as strange.”44
Heidegger includes himself among those discomfited by the multifarious claim that we need to “learn to think,” that most “thought-provoking
measurements, more or less exactly carried out” (ibid.). And Planck goes on to observe
that talk of objects is arbitrary and one should only speak of “complexes of sense perceptions” rather than, say, the “rustling” of the leaves of a tree (ibid.)—a claim that Heidegger
expressly opposes, in Husserl’s spirit and with his own emphases. For his part, and this
should matter for Carson, Planck goes on to emphasize that any discussion of measures
“presupposes that the progress of the phenomena is not influenced by the measuring instrument” (ibid., p. 98).
37. Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn
Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 3.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 7.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p. 8.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p. 12; Heidegger, Basic Writings, p. 353.
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of all is that we are still not thinking,” that “science does not think,” and
must give themselves over or endure what is “shocking and strange about
thinking.”45
This is what makes what Heidegger writes about thinking so very
strange. For most of us, “thinking” and being able to think whether one is a
philosopher, a scientist, or what have you, simply goes without saying for
human beings, we who call ourselves the animals who “have” logos: we
are the thinking animal. But Heidegger would say that our saying so goes
without thinking altogether. And he argues that as thinking slips out of its
proper “element it replaces this loss by procuring a validity for itself as
techne, as an instrument of education, and therefore as a classroom matter
and later a cultural concern.”46
The point for Heidegger has everything to do with the quite related
concerns of the then active Frankfurt School,47 arguing that philosophies
offer themselves up for popular consumption and rate, and are rated by,
such standards. Thus those who “busy” themselves with philosophy “offer
themselves as -isms and try to offer more than others.” This is the marketplace of ideas, and it is significant that where the second-century satirist
Lucian took this for granted, namely, that the very idea of “philosophies
for sale” (the title of one of his satires) would strike his audience as dissonant, and hence good for a laugh,48 and so too, of course, Bacon, we
have become much more comfortable with the notion of philosophizing
for popular consumption—this is the very problematic meaning of a “public” intellectual—and subject to the evaluation of popular consumption.
Hannah Arendt’s own reflections seem to echo Heidegger’s distinction
here, which and to be sure Heidegger draws out from Jaspers and others, in
his reflection on the private sphere by contrast with the public sphere, if he
also here simply spells out the cognate point he makes in Being and Time
(and this together with popular misreadings of this text is his reference
here). Thus he argues that:
Private existence is not really essential, i.e., free human being. It simply
insists on negating the public realm. It remains an offshoot that depends
45. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking, p. 5.
46. Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” p. 197.
47. Ibid. Habermas has become rather less critical about “the peculiar dictatorship of
the public realm.”
48. Lucian, “Philosophers for Sale.” See also his “Fisherman or the Dead Come to
Life.” For a discussion of Lucian’s parodic schema, see Babette Babich, “The Philosopher
and the Volcano,” Philosophy Today 55 (2011): 213–31.
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upon the public and nourishes itself by a mere withdrawal from it. Hence
it testifies against its own will to its subservience to the public realm.49
But because it stems from the dominance of subjectivity the public
realm itself is the metaphysically conditioned establishment and authorization of the openness of individual beings in their unconditional
objectification. Language thereby falls into the service of expediting
communication along routes where objectification—the uniform accessibility of everything to everyone—branches out and disregards all
limits. In this way language comes under the dictatorship of the public
realm which decides in advance what is intelligible and what must be
described as unintelligible.50

Already here there is the basis for a Heideggerian coordination of Adorno’s
similar challenge, an alliance that Adorno to be sure, meaning to make this
point his own point, refused. Habermas, by contrast, simply endorsed the
public realm renaming it as an ultimately democratic possibility of communicative discourse by locating it not in the present but as always already
dynamic in social interaction.
Famously Habermas refuses both Heidegger’s claim and its parallel to
the concerns of critical theory with the ad hominem insistence that
Heidegger’s critical judgements . . . on the dictatorship of the public
realm and the impotence of the private sphere, on technocracy and mass
civilisation, are without any originality whatsoever because they belong
to a repertoire of opinions typical of a certain generation of German
mandarins.51

There are those who have taken upon themselves the necessary difficulties of reading between Heidegger and Adorno, and the project of reading
between Heidegger and Habermas probably remains to be done—though
one has first to engage the greater challenge of what Habermas has done,
in effect, to so mute the legacy of the Frankfurt School as to make the
effort hardly worth the bother, one would seem to have other concerns.
What remains true is that we overlook the important reference to critical
49. Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” p. 197.
50. Ibid.
51. Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick
Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 140.
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theory here if we do not draw such parallels, despite the objections on both
sides of the fence.52
But the line in the sand concerns the standardized absolute of universal public discourse, which as our own era is all about this standardized
universal, it will do to look at this just a bit more closely. Thus, in What Is
Called Thinking, Heidegger writes, not unlike Adorno:
Today every newspaper, every illustrated magazine, and every radio
program offers all things in the identical way to uniform views. . . . The
one-sided view . . . has puffed itself up into an all-sidedness which in turn
is masked so as to look harmless and natural. But this all-sided view
which deals in all and everything with equal uniformity and mindlessness . . . reduces everything to a univocity of concepts and specifications
the precision of which not only corresponds to, but has the same essential origin as, the precision of technological process.53

This takes Heidegger to language, and there he always turns to the artists,
the fabricators of language or the word, those who make, who bring forth
or call into being, as it is those who make who are the poets.
As Heidegger writes in his “Letter on Humanism”:
Thinking brings this relation to Being solely as something handed over
to it from Being. Such offering consists in the fact that in thinking Being
comes to language. Language is the house of Being. In its home the
human dwells. Those who think and those who create with words are the
guardians of this home.54

In “What Calls for Thinking,” what is at stake for Heidegger remains the
paradox with which he begins, the “human being still does not think, and
just because what must be thought about turns away from him.”55 In other
words it is not about the human; it is not a shortcoming of the scientist
that one is, as Heidegger repeats, “still not thinking.” Instead, what must
be thought about “withdraws” from the human: “What withdraws from
us draws us along by its very withdrawal whether we become aware of
52. For a discussion that by no means panders to Heidegger, see Dana Villa, Arendt
and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP), pp. 215ff.
53. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking, pp. 33–34.
54. Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” p. 193.
55. Ibid.. Heidegger, “What Calls for Thinking,” in Basic Writings, p. 7, altered.
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it immediately, or at all.”56 This is of course, as commonly said, very like
Benjamin’s angel of history: “As we are drawing toward what withdraws,
we ourselves point toward it.”57 And this is how Heidegger defines the
human, as a pointer, a sign. I recall Alphonso Lingis’s articulation of the
exemplary humanism of the “anthropological” phenomenology of human
morphology, upright as we are in the world.58 Thus “the human is a sign,”
but Heidegger quotes Hölderlin: “We are a sign that is not read.”59 Adding
the continuation that was key for both Heidegger and Gadamer:
We feel no pain, we almost have
Lost our tongue in foreign lands.

Indeed, what bears reflection for Heidegger, as he reflects in his lecture
course, The Ister, is exactly what is needed for the sake of history, to the
extent that “historical language is in and of itself in need of translation, and
not merely in relation to foreign languages.”60
For Heidegger, what we learn from Hölderlin, in his poetizing, in his
encounter with Greece, in his translations, is above all that we are in need,
and this in our own tongue, of a translation, of an interpretative effort:
“translation is more an awakening, clarification, and unfolding, of one’s
own language with the help of an encounter with the foreign language.”61
The point is not simply that we may, as Heidegger here points out to his
students, “speak ‘German’ yet talk entirely ‘American,’” but rather that
no “historical people” is “of its own accord,” that is to say, “without its
own intervention, at home in its own language.”62 So much attention to
the anxious apprehension that a German poet might remember his own
tongue in his experiences as a wanderer in France, reflecting on the Greek
conception of mortal being cast, dispersed upon the earth, alienated from
a higher dimension, a literally metaphysical dimension, earthly beings, as
56. Heidegger, “What Calls for Thinking,” p. 7.
57. Ibid., p. 5
58. See Lingis’s several studies, particularly his The Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1994) and his Foreign Bodies (London: Routledge, 1994), as well as his First
Person Singular (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 2007).
59. Hölderlin, Mnemosyne, and also, as Heidegger notes, Hölderlin’s The Serpent,
The Sign, The Nymph.
60. Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister”, trans. William McNeill and
Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1996), p. 65.
61. Ibid., pp. 65–66.
62. Ibid., p. 65.
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we find ourselves on “Hertha green” (as Hölderlin writes in The Ister), but
and no less as “children of heaven” (as Hölderlin also writes).63 In What Is
Called Thinking, Heidegger reminds us with reference to the church and
its persistence, and at the same time about the Enlightenment and all its
claims, “nothing religious is ever destroyed by logic; it is destroyed only
by the god’s withdrawal.”64
The movement is one that invites us to “openness,” and this is the
heart of Heidegger’s attunement, “to be ready and willing to listen,”65 as
it is this listening attunement that sets Heidegger against the church as
that so-named “church” matters for him as it matters for his then-listeners
and for us today. Yet the clear “danger” in an academic context, that is,
in university discourse, is that a specific reverence is reserved for the
sciences, the hard sciences, that is to say, those sciences that “forcibly”
require us, in Heidegger’s words here, to “rack our brains.” Thus everyone admits that the arts and sciences differ, as Heidegger observes, while
yet conjoining them (faculties of arts and sciences and such). Thus when
one distinguishes “between thinking and the sciences,” the conclusion is
immediately taken that what is intended “disparage(s)” the latter.66
Heidegger, as he learned from Nietzsche, was at pains to avoid a
thinking of for and against, a pro and con thinking discouraged in Being
and Time, only to have exactly this thinking hung around his neck as an
opponent of this or of that—most particularly of the inauthentic and the
like. But Heidegger was at pains, however unsuccessfully, to remind his
readers that the negative in question had to do less with a deficit than a
standard or stock or ordinary way of being, one with another alongside the
world or the worlds of one’s with world and one’s concerns. In the case
of his specific comments regarding the church, Heidegger suggests, in a
perfectly Lutheran spirit, that it would be bad form within the church itself
to speak against the church. Thus he emphasizes speaking of what counts
for us as “the” high church of all churches, and that is of science: “When
we speak of the sciences as we pursue our way, we shall be speaking not
63. See here the important reading that Heidegger gives of Hölderlin’s Bread and
Wine in his essays on language and of his discussion of the fourfold with respect to Trakl
in Martin Heidegger, “Language,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter
(New York: Harper & Row, 1971).
64. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking, p. 5.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 8.
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against but for them, for clarity concerning their essential nature.”67 That
“essential nature” as we know, readers of the Question Concerning Technology as we are, and as he also takes care to tell us in this separate locus,
is indeed reflected in what he calls the “exciting fact that today’s sciences
belong in the realm of the essence of modern technology, and nowhere
else.”68
Having said this, however, Heidegger proceeds to step away from both
the techno-enthusiast and the acolyte of the church of science, and especially of the academy, with all its sense of itself and its highly intellectual
qualities, by turning toward the joiner’s art: cabinetry. The craftsman, and
here Heidegger speaks with Plato who spoke of the shoemaker, as a man
of the polis, as he speaks with Aristotle, who himself, in the little we know
of his life, grew up in an intrigue-beseiged kingdom’s court (his father,
Nicomachus, was physician to Amyntas II, father of Philip the Great, who
was in turn father of Alexander the Great).69 Heidegger underscores the
fact that we know next to nothing about Aristotle’s life in the driest of
fashions, recounted to us by his students as he begins his 1924 lecture
course on Aristotle with just such an incipit.70 When Arendt, who made
this anecdote famous, also underlines that what Heidegger says of Aristotle gives us the minimum that can be said of Aristotle with any certainty,71
we also recall that hermeneutics teaches us that just this barest of contexts
also frames the way we might read the Nicomachean Ethics, which begins
indeed by speaking of the nested nature of “every art and every inquiry,”
illustrating the point by speaking of the art of shipbuilding and of strategy,
and not less related to this of the bridle maker’s art as well as “the art of
riding,” thus ordering “this and every military action under strategy.”72
Indeed, it makes a difference that is still worth further exploration that
when we speak of the virtues, we find ourselves talking about virtues like
courage that most of us can never have known, because courage is a very
specifically military virtue as it must be regularly practiced in the face of
67. Ibid., p. 14.
68. Ibid.
69. McKeon mentions this in his prefatory words to his edition of The Basic Works of
Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), p. xiv.
70. Martin Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. Robert D.
Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2009), p. 4.
71. Hannah Arendt, “Martin Heidegger at Eighty,” in Michael Murray, ed., Heidegger
and Modern Philosophy (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1978), p. 297.
72. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1.1094a.
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death (unless our times become, as Slavoj Žižek likes to remind us of the
Chinese curse, yet more “interesting”).73 Thus, the Aristotle who details
such noble or warrior virtues grew up as a boyhood friend of Philip of
Macedon, and who was to be invited back to Macedon as Alexander’s
tutor, came to Athens and retired from Athens in the historical constellation of such politics. This makes a huge difference—as Aristotle would
say, it makes “all the difference.”74
For his own part, Heidegger reprises his earlier illustration of the
equipmental (and the Aristotelian resonance of purposes and occupation
matters here) array or constellation of world and care in Being and Time,
invoking the cabinetmaker’s craft as he proceeds to do, as an apprentice
learns this essence, as he “makes himself answer and respond above all to
the different kinds of wood and to the shapes slumbering within wood—to
wood as it enters into human dwelling with all the hidden riches of its
nature.”75 This relatedness is what makes the joiner one who is a woodworker as such. “Without that relatedness, the craft will never be anything
but empty busywork, any occupation with it will be determined exclusively by business concerns. Every handicraft, all human dealings are
constantly in that danger.”76 If Heidegger can here emphasize as he does
that the “writing of poetry is no more exempt from it than is thinking,”77
it is clear today that political action is also endangered. With the current
movements of Occupy Wall Street, nothing could be clearer than such
“business concerns,” nor could the “danger” of what Adorno and Marcuse
called co-option or Žižek’s warning not to “fall in love with yourself” be
more urgent.78
If Heidegger then goes on to the section of the text that captivates Derrida, to speak of hands, as Lou Salomé was also captivated by Nietzsche’s
73. “Welcome to Interesting Times” serves as the afterword to the paperback edition
of Slavoj Žižek, Living in the End Times (London: Verso, 2011).
74. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1103b. Related to my observation here, I recommend Richard Bodéüs, who points to some of the extraordinary complexities of the
broader Greek context even in the case of so patently familiar a thinker as Aristotle. See
both his The Political Dimensions of Aristotle’s Ethics, trans. Jan Garrett (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1993) and his Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals, trans. Jan Garrett
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2000).
75. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking, p. 14.
76. Ibid., p. 15.
77. Ibid.
78. See the instant book edited by Carla Blumenkranz, et al., Occupy!: Scenes from
Occupied America (New York and London: Verso, 2011).
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hands, Heidegger’s point is that “the hand’s gestures run everywhere
through language, in their most perfect purity, precisely when man speaks
by being silent. And only when man speaks does he think—not the other
way around, as metaphysics still believes.”79 The point for Heidegger
is that thinking is “humanity’s simplest, and for that reason, hardest
handiwork.”80
Elsewhere Heidegger reminds us that it can seem that philosophy has
simply dissolved into the sciences, but this is the completion of philosophy.
All of this, he says, requires little predictive power to name in the name of
cybernetics, inasmuch as this last “science corresponds to the determination of the human being as an acting social being.”81 With this reference to
cybernetics and the connection to the social, we have a clear connection
to today’s discussion of network actors, even if as we recall (and perhaps
for good reason, and Adorno had the same kind of allergies), that Latour
is on the defense when it comes to Heidegger, as indeed Heidegger had
been, as he was not at the root of any academic travail that Latour may
have suffered in the past.82 Thus, Heidegger argues as a matter of fulfillment or culmination (and this too is a way to look at the postmetaphysics)
that “philosophy is ending in the present age. It has found its place in the
scientific attitude of social humanity. But the fundamental characteristic of
this scientific attitude is its cybernetic, that is, technological character.”83
The point here, as Heidegger seeks to underscore this (this is the relevance
of his alternative title, “The Task of Thinking”), is the rule of theory, taking the definition of the same in terms of its cyberneticality, as it were,
whereby the “operational and model character of representational-calculative thinking becomes dominant.”84
79. Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking, p. 16.
80. Ibid.
81. Martin Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” in On
Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (San Francisco: Harper, 1972), p. 58.
82. Latour indeed need not be so apprehensive for, as noted earlier in the discussion,
many technically-technologically minded Heideggerians have proven themselves well able
to read between Latour and Heidegger, and indeed to Latour’s benefit, if it must also be
said that many scholars read Heidegger today with the express intention of leaving him
behind, which means indeed using as a deliberate tactic, a clear non-reading: thus we are,
automatically, after or post-Heidegger.
83. Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” p. 58 (my emphasis, for clarity).
84. Ibid., p. 59.
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Thus, one can argue (and, to be sure, some have indeed already sought
to argue) that Heidegger is a transhumanist or else (and this is much the
same) that he fails to be a transhumanist.85 But to read Heidegger in this
way is to stop reading, taking Heidegger’s remarks as what stands without
question, as if for Heidegger standing apart from any possible need for
questioning would or could be a good thing. Indeed, Heidegger here goes
on to predict what has come to pass in the interim, complete with a number
of Heideggerian accounts of the same, at least with regard to cognitive
science. For example:
The sciences are now taking over as their own task what philosophy
in the course of its history tried to present in certain places, and even
there only inadequately, that is, the ontologies of the various regions of
beings (nature, history, law, art). . . . The operational and model character
of representation-calculative thinking becomes dominant.86

In this way, and by observing that no part of the dominion of science (in
this techno-cybernetical sense, we can go ahead and say digital if we like),
what functions on the university or academic level as “philosophy” has
been left behind. Thus, what Heidegger means by invoking “the end of
philosophy” means the culmination of, the consummation or fulfillment
of philosophy. This is nothing but the globalization of technology, which
“proves to be the triumph of the manipulable arrangement of a scientifictechnological world and of the social order proper to this world. The end
of philosophy means the beginning of the world civilization based upon
Western European thinking.”87

85. There are very few criticisms of transhumanism, probably for reasons that Günther Anders had already analyzed in 1956 in his Antiquierheit, eleven years after the end,
as Geert Lovink dates it, in the weaker wake of Adorno, or death of humanism as such “in
1945.” Anders writes that we do not want to ‘appear’ reactionary. Geert Lovink argues that
we don’t want to seem to be out of it—this is behind his praise of Alan Liu’s “cool”—but
what has not changed is his 1998 assessment: “There is no radical critique of the new
technologies.” Both citations are from Geert Lovink, “Critique of Transhumanism,” available online at http://www.alamut.com/subj/ideologies/pessimism/lovinkTrans.html. This
diagnosis holds of both older and younger theorists, these days including Lovink himself.
See, again, for a discussion of Anders in the context of Sloterdijk’s Rules for the Human
Zoo, the concluding section of Babich, “Sloterdijk’s Cynicism,” esp. pp. 26ff.
86. Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” p. 59.
87. Ibid.
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What “task” is left for thinking at this juncture? What remains? Here
Heidegger inquires after (with a naïveté that seems breathtaking given the
prescience of his other insights) “the possibility that the world civilization
which is just now beginning might” well or might yet still “one day overcome the technological-scientific-industrial character as the sole criterion
of the human world sojourn”?88 Heidegger thus recommends a turn “to
the things themselves,” a call he traces via Hegel and then to Husserl
(thus including every Cartesian echo), noting that “from the perspective
of Hegel and Husserl—and not only from their perspective—the matter of
philosophy is subjectivity.”89
If we can see all this, we can also see what inspires Heidegger to write
as he does in “Overcoming Metaphysics,” echoing what he had earlier
written in his Contributions, where he addresses nothing less than the very
calculated violence of his reading of Nietzsche’s Übermensch contra the
rhetoric and force of the Nazi Superman. I note as an essential aside in the
current context, as I move here to conclude that America, as we all know,
has had, like Nazi Germany, its own fantastic image of the same modern
technological imaginary: a none-too-Allied Superman, pure Americana,
true blue and all the way.90 Not George Bernard Shaw’s vision of Man
and Superman, as that was for its part too theoretical, too conscious of the
Nietzschean compounds, complexities that accrued to such a constellation, but and just the pulp comic-book hero Superman, as that marvelous
cartoon embodiment of the modern technological imaginary is only an
extension of that ideal of the secret higher life that is also the firm article of
faith for so very many mild-mannered Clark Kents, living their everyday
lives.
Clark Kent turns out to exemplify the qualities of the subhuman, recalling Lois Lane’s persuaded sense of Clark’s utter lack of appeal, a lack
magically to be remedied, as all such revelations continue to be remedied
88. Ibid., p. 60.
89. Ibid., p. 64.
90. It is Superman’s costume that is striking in the first issue of Action Comics, published in 1938, featuring his characteristic red cape and matching red underwear worn
over a blue jumpsuit with red socks as knee high boots, channeling a more streamlined,
futuristic version of Flash Gordon’s patently Nazi short pants (ca. 1934). Indeed the aesthetic iconography of Superman’s pose (holding a green Volkswagen in a full barbell press
lunge over his head, while dashing its front trunk to bits against a rock, thus shattering the
Volkswagen’s famously un-sturdy front bumper and sending one tire flying) is less of a
challenge for political analysis than the question of whether Superman (and not Madonna)
inspired Michael Jackson’s penchant for wearing underwear/bodysuits over his jeans.
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not only in comic books but on the silver screen, for both men and women,
in the cliché fantasies of Hollywood, requiring in the end nothing like
a skin-tight blue jumpsuit, complete with red cape and boots, but only
the removal of a pair of eyeglasses. Eyeglasses are thereby revealed as
being—this we recall out of the depths of our collective, cinematic imaginary—the original and all-purpose cybernetic signifier. In this way, as it
happens using the very same routing, contact lenses turn out to be the
seamless route to transhuman excellence: a supermodel in the germ. Thus,
ceteris paribus, outfitted with so many similarly subtle enhancements, all
of us can be, if to be sure for a yet to be specified fee, set on the path of the
supposedly incipient ultimate upgrade that is the pretended or affected or
imagined (pick one) technological singularity, which if one sets a date on
it may be expected to come and go rather in the fashion of a fundamentalist preacher’s claim to a similarly apocalyptic rapture on the model of the
end of days.
Speaking of the nihilism that is in our times more urgent than ever,
under the sign of what he calls the “unconditional completion of nihilism,” Heidegger writes of what he calls “the armament mechanism of the
plan,”91 using the language of his day. If we have other words for our part
now, if the mechanism remains unchanged:
Subhumanity and superhumanity are the same thing. They belong
together, just as the “below” of animality and the “above” of the ratio
are indissolubly coupled in correspondence in the metaphysical animal
rationale.92

Of course, we almost do not need to mention that Heidegger cannot but
add the caveat that “Sub- and super-humanity are to be thought here metaphysically, not as moral value judgments.”93 What matters is supreme
calculability, perfect performance: thus automatic, thus all about the
automaton (just as Günther Anders for his own part underlines). Heidegger
notes that “instinct is required for superhumanity” precisely because “subhumanity belongs to superhumanity, but in such a way that precisely the
animal element is thoroughly subjugated in each of its forms to calculation
91. Martin Heidegger, “Overcoming Metaphysics,” in The End of Philosophy, trans.
Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 103.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
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and planning (health plans, breeding).”94 We can be eager to interrupt this
by adding the idea of the implanted bits of the technology we love most
today: cellphone receivers, GPS chips, and maybe something somewhat
more elegant, more functional than the mechanical limbs, hearing aids,
and pacemakers currently on offer.95 But we also suppose the still-promissory full deployment of the genetic engineering that Heidegger already
takes for granted here.
Heidegger is talking both about the designation of the world as worldfor-us, for our purposes, so many military exercises for business benefit,
as that initially expresses itself in terms of atomic escalation, which has
in the interim simply slid back into the same gas station and shale field
explosions of a technological dependence on energy that never, in the end,
found its way to another means of fuel: in case it remains, as Heidegger
writes, that “the using is a using up.”96 In the process, Heidegger hits upon
the point that also remains central for current speculative interests: “Man
is the ‘most important raw material’ because he remains the subject of all
consumption.”97 Whatever Marxian reading of Heidegger may be worked
out, it would have, it should, begin with this: the “circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption is the sole procedure which distinctively
characterizes the history of a world which has become an unworld.”98 Heidegger transforms Clausewitz, as Foucault would later do in Society Must
Be Defended, by writing at a time when nothing was more patent than “War
has becomes a distortion of the consumption of beings which is continued
in peace.”99 In the context of noting that “the distinction between war and
peace has become untenable,” he adds well in advance of the discourse of
globalization, that “the distinction between ‘national’ and ‘international’
has also collapsed.”100 Heidegger adds that we are living on the edge of this
problem and its unrestrained, and possibly non-restrainable, issue to our
pain, such that we live on the terms of nothing but the impossible, taken
to eternity. But Heidegger is fond of rustic examples, which means that
we tend to mock him for that, and to overlook what he says as he reminds
94. Ibid., p. 106.
95. As Michael Chorost has observed, “Thousands of people need better prosthetic
limbs. No one knows how to make them.” Quoted on the title page of his article “Waiting
for the Bionic Man,” Wired, April 2012.
96. Heidegger, “Overcoming Metaphysics,” p. 103.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., p. 107.
99. Ibid., p. 104.
100. Ibid., p. 107.
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us that the “birch tree never oversteps its possibility. The colony of bees
dwells in its possibility.”101 By contrast, modern science and technology
devours the earth in the exhaustion and consumption and change of what
is artificial. Technology drives the earth beyond the developed sphere of
its possibility into such things which are no longer a possibility and are
thus the impossibility.102

Žižek teases us as we listen as the good and docile sheep of the media,
in the virtually real or integral order, that we suppose nothing more likely
than the technological possibility of the imaginary precisely by contrast
with the “can’t be done” or enjoined symbolic impossibility that would be
at stake in any bid to change the order of rule, such that the world need not
work as industrial leaders, i.e., as business interests, command that everything be done for the sake of business interest or profit. We attend on the
same for what we hope might one day—although it never has—yet accrue
to ourselves as wanna-be capitalists. (We think we are investors if we have
a bank account or a pension, and actual capitalists love that we think that.)
Thus we are complicit, but Heidegger, who thinks that more is possible
than what we suppose about possibility and impossibility, suggests what
he called Ereignis in his Contributions and here again at the conclusion of
Overcoming Metaphysics: that appropriating might bring “mortals to the
path of thinking, poetizing, building.”103

101. Ibid., p. 109.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid., p. 110.

